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POM WONDERFUL V. COCA-COLA AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF GRANTING
COMPETITORS THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE
FALSE OR MISLEADING FOOD AND
BEVERAGE LABELS UNDER THE
LANHAM ACT
Matthew Busch∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,1 the United States
Supreme Court unanimously decided that the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not preclude Lanham Act suits
between competitors challenging false or misleading food and
beverage labeling.2 This ruling means that food and beverage makers
do not have to rely exclusively on the United States Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to bring enforcement actions against
competitors engaged in false advertising.3 POM Wonderful instead
allows for a private right of action, empowering food and beverage
makers to bring suit against companies whose false or misleading
labels cause competitive injury.4
This Comment examines POM Wonderful in detail, approving
of its result, while pointing out questions left unanswered due to the
Court’s limited holding. Part II of the Comment provides background
on the statutory and regulatory framework underlying the Lanham
Act and the FDCA. Part III lays out the relevant factual and
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. History, University
of California, Berkeley, 2009. Special thanks to Professor Jennifer E. Rothman for her time,
attention, and legal advice. Thanks to Cameron Bell and Andrew Beshai; without their help, this
Comment would not have been possible.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
2. Id. at 2241.
3. See id. at 2239; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at
27, POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (No. 12-761), 2014 WL 827980, at *27.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238.
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procedural background that led to the Court’s decision. Part IV
discusses the Court’s justification for why the Lanham Act and the
FDCA are complementary. Part V analyzes the following questions
raised by the case: Will the decision have any effect on
consumer-driven false-advertising suits? Will courts apply POM
Wonderful beyond food and beverage labeling? Is the Supreme Court
wary of the primacy of federal administrative agencies? Finally, Part
VI answers these questions and concludes that allowing
competitor-versus-competitor false-advertising suits will give
companies greater power to police their own markets and prevent
competitors from gaining advantages through use of false or
misleading labeling.
II. THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Lanham Act
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act to make actionable
the deceptive and misleading use of trademarks, to protect against
unfair competition, and to prevent fraudulent reproduction of
registered trademarks.5 While the Lanham Act’s trademark
provisions are the primary means of safeguarding against unfair
competition, the Act also creates a federal remedy “that goes beyond
trademark protection.”6 Further, the Lanham Act creates a cause of
action for unfair competition through misleading advertising or
labeling.7 The Act allows one competitor to sue another if, “in
commercial advertising or promotion,” a competitor “misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities.”8
B. The FDCA
Enacted in 1938, the FDCA gives the FDA authority to protect
public health and safety through the regulation of food, drugs, and

5. Lanham (Trademark) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 1127).
6. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003).
7. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1395 (2014).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
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cosmetics.9 In this capacity, the FDCA prohibits the false or
misleading labeling of food and beverages.10 If the FDA determines
that a particular food or drink label is false or misleading, it has the
power to issue warning letters requesting that the product
manufacturer take corrective action.11 In addition, if a false or
misleading food or beverage label “presents a risk of illness or injury
or gross consumer deception,” the FDA may request that the
manufacturer recall the product.12 Food and beverage labels,
however, are not regulated to the same extent as other product labels
under the FDCA’s purview, namely drug labels.13 While the FDA
preapproves drug labels prior to sale,14 it does not preapprove juice
labels under its regulations.15
By its terms, the FDCA does not provide for a private right of
action.16 Accordingly, prior to POM Wonderful, a food and beverage
manufacturer injured by a competitor’s misbranding was at the
mercy of the FDA.17 An injured competitor could only rely on FDA
enforcement if the agency, at its own discretion, determined that the
mislabeled food or drink adversely impacted public health or
safety.18
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
POM Wonderful LLC (“POM”) produces, markets, and sells
POM WONDERFUL brand bottled pomegranate juice and various
pomegranate juice blends.19 The Coca-Cola Company (“CocaCola”), under its Minute Maid family of products, makes a
competing juice blend with a label that displays the words
“pomegranate blueberry” far more prominently than other words on

9. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(f) (2012)); see 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593,
596 (1951).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 343(a).
11. See id. § 336.
12. 21 C.F.R. § 7.45(a) (2014).
13. See 21 U.S.C. § 355.
14. See id. § 355(d).
15. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2235 (2014).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 337.
17. See id.
18. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985).
19. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2233.
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the label.20 In truth, Coca-Cola’s product only contains 0.3 percent
pomegranate juice and 0.2 percent blueberry juice.21
Claiming that Coca-Cola’s use of the label is deceptive and
misleading, POM brought suit under the Lanham Act’s
false-advertising provision.22 According to POM, because
Coca-Cola’s product only contains trace amounts of pomegranate
and blueberry juices, Coca-Cola can charge less for its beverage than
its competitors can charge for theirs.23 POM argued that because
consumers invariably select cheaper products believed to be of the
same quality, Coca-Cola unfairly diverts business from POM and
other competitors in the pomegranate-blueberry juice market.24
Nevertheless, the district court granted partial summary
judgment to Coca-Cola, holding that the FDCA and its regulations
preclude challenges to the naming and labeling of Coca-Cola’s juice
blend.25 The court reasoned that “[t]he FDA has directly spoken on
the issues that form the basis of Pom’s Lanham Act claim” and has
ruled that the Coca-Cola label is acceptable “even if pomegranate
and/or blueberry are merely characteristic, rather than primary juices
in the [j]uice.”26
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding
that Congress had “entrust[ed] matters of juice beverage labeling to
the FDA,” and it did not want to “risk undercutting the FDA’s expert
judgments and authority.”27
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In an 8–0 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s ruling and held that “the FDCA and the Lanham Act
complement each other in the federal regulation of misleading

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012).
23. First Amended Complaint for False Advertising at 7, Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola
Co., No. CV 08-06237 SJO (FMOx), 2013 WL 543361 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2013), 2009 WL
2913255.
24. Id.
25. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2235–36.
26. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 849, 871–73 (C.D. Cal. 2010),
rev’d, 679 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. 2228.
27. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d,
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. 2228.
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labels.”28 As a preliminary matter, the Court narrowed the scope of
its decision by explaining that POM Wonderful is not a preemption
case, in which the question would be whether a federal statute
supersedes a state law.29 Instead, the Court recognized that POM
Wonderful is a statutory interpretation case involving the
“intersection and complementarity” of two statutory regimes, the
Lanham Act and the FDCA.30
POM argued that the preclusion analysis “concern[ed] whether
one statute, the FDCA as amended, is an ‘implied repeal’ in part of
another statute, i.e., the Lanham Act.”31 According to POM, the
Court must give full effect to both statutes unless they were in
“irreconcilable conflict,” and Coca-Cola failed to satisfy this high
standard.32 By contrast, Coca-Cola argued that “the case concern[ed]
whether a more specific law, the FDCA, clarifies or narrows the
scope of a more general law, the Lanham Act.”33 Ignoring both of
these “competing maxims,” the Court held that “the FDCA and the
Lanham Act are complementary and have separate scopes and
purposes.”34 While “the Lanham Act protects commercial interests
against unfair competition,” the Court stressed that the FDCA is
limited to “protect[ing] public health and safety.”35
The Court supported its conclusion that the FDCA and the
Lanham Act are complementary by first interpreting the two statutes’
text.36 By its terms, the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act
(NLEA), a 1990 amendment to the FDCA, includes an express
preemption provision and does not contain any preclusion language
preventing another federal law from regulating food and beverage
labeling.37 According to the Court, Congress’s omission of a
preclusion provision serves as “powerful evidence that Congress did

28.
at 2241.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Justice Breyer took no part in the consideration of this case. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct.
Id. at 2236.
Id. at 2233.
Id. at 2236–37.
Id. at 2237.
Id.
Id. at 2236, 2240.
Id. at 2238.
Id. at 2237.
Id.
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not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring
proper food and beverage labeling.”38
Next, the Court examined the complementary nature of the
remedies offered by both statutes.39 The Court explained that
enforcement of the FDCA is largely committed to the FDA, which
“does not have the same perspective or expertise in assessing market
dynamics that day-to-day consumers possess.”40 By contrast, the
Court recognized that unlike agency rulemakers, competitors are
uniquely positioned to assess sales and marketing data.41 And,
because Lanham Act suits serve a distinct compensatory function,
the Court reasoned that allowing for a private right of action would
incentivize manufacturers to “behave well.”42
Finally, the Court explained that allowing the FDCA to preclude
Lanham Act claims challenging food and beverage labels would
contravene Congress’s intent.43 Unlike drug labels, food and
beverage labels are not subject to FDA preapproval, and instead the
FDA relies on enforcement actions and warning letters to police
these types of labels.44 According to the Court, “if Lanham Act
claims were to be precluded then commercial interests—and
indirectly the public at large—could be left with less effective
protection in the food and beverage labeling realm than in many
other, less regulated industries.”45 The FDCA’s failure to adequately
safeguard competitors’ commercial interests influenced the Court’s
belief that Congress did not intend for there to be less policing of
food and beverage labels than of other products’ labels in
competitive markets.46
For these reasons, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding
that the FDCA is not “a ceiling on the regulation of food and
beverage labeling” and noting instead that the Lanham Act and the
FDCA are complementary in the federal regulation of misleading
labels.47 Additionally, the Court noted that “Lanham Act actions are
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 2238.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2238–39.
Id. at 2239.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 2240.
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a means to implement a uniform policy to prevent unfair competition
in all covered markets.”48 Consequently, the Court decided that
Coca-Cola’s argument that Lanham Act food labeling claims would
undermine national uniformity was without merit.49
V. ANALYSIS
The Court correctly decided that competitors may bring Lanham
Act claims challenging food and beverage labels regulated by the
FDCA. Allowing for a federal private right of action will empower
companies to bring suit against competitors whose false or
misleading labels cause competitive injury. Before the POM
Wonderful decision, FDA warning letters and the threat of
administrative enforcement actions proved insufficient remedies to
companies suffering economic loss attributable to competitors’ false
or misleading labels. But, in the wake of POM Wonderful,
companies may obtain the same remedy available to consumers
under state consumer protection statutes, an injunction requiring a
product label change.50
Even though POM Wonderful was fundamentally correct, the
Court’s ruling still raises questions: Will the decision have any effect
on consumer-driven false-advertising suits? Will courts extend the
ruling beyond the scope of food and beverage labeling? Finally, does
the decision reflect the Supreme Court’s wariness of the longstanding dominance of federal administrative agencies? These
questions are addressed in the sections that follow.
A. POM Wonderful’s Impact on
Consumer-Driven False-Advertising Suits
The POM Wonderful Court explicitly narrowed the scope of its
inquiry to the interplay between two federal statutes when it
explained that this case was “not a pre-emption case.”51
Consequently, the decision did not address the feasibility of

48. Id.
49. See id.
50. Adam M. Reich et al., POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca Cola Company: Have the Tides
Turned in the Legal Food Fight?, LEXOLOGY (July 1, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=dcb012e3-2fdf-4eed-9ef7-9ad4c1de383e (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 17200 (West 2014)).
51. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2236.
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traditional defenses to consumer class actions challenging food and
beverage labels.52
With respect to preemption, the POM Wonderful Court
acknowledged that the NLEA, the FDCA’s 1990 amendment, has a
preemption provision that expressly forbids “a State . . . from
imposing requirements that are . . . not identical to corresponding
FDCA requirements for food and beverage labeling.”53 Accordingly,
courts generally find that the NLEA preempts state law food and
beverage labeling claims in which the disputed label has been
specifically addressed by, and conforms to, existing FDA
regulations.54 Because the POM Wonderful Court explicitly stated it
would not address preemption, the preemption defense remains a
severe hurdle to class action plaintiffs seeking to invoke state
consumer protection laws.55
Similarly, the primary jurisdiction doctrine remains a cognizable
defense in the wake of POM Wonderful.56 “The primary jurisdiction
doctrine allows courts to stay proceedings or to dismiss a complaint
without prejudice pending the resolution of an issue within the
special competence of an administrative agency.”57 In other words,
primary jurisdiction enables a court to determine that an otherwise
valid claim “implicates technical and policy questions that should be
addressed in the first instance by the agency with regulatory
authority over the relevant industry rather than by the judicial
branch.”58
For example, in Saubers v. Kashi Co.,59 class action plaintiffs
brought state law claims against Kashi arguing that its food products

52. Reich et al., supra note 50.
53. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1 (2012); POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
54. See, e.g., Young v. Johnson & Johnson, 525 F. App’x 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Because
[plaintiff’s] state law action seeks to impose [cholesterol labeling] standards that are not identical
to those set forth in the [FDA’s] regulations, it is expressly preempted by the NLEA as it relates
to those claims.”); Carrera v. Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc., 475 F. App’x 113, 115 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding that claims that an ice cream manufacturer violated California consumer
protection laws by stating that its product contained “0g Trans Fat” were expressly preempted by
the NLEA, which permits products containing less than 0.5 grams of trans fat per serving to
express this amount as zero).
55. See Reich et al., supra note 50.
56. Id.
57. Clark v. Time Warner Cable, 523 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2008).
58. Id.
59. No. 13CV899 JLS (BLM), 2014 WL 3908595 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2014).
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were “misbranded.”60 According to the plaintiffs, Kashi’s use of the
term “evaporated cane juice” on its labels was false and misleading
because evaporated cane juice is merely ordinary sugar.61 Because
the FDA was still waiting on public comments before it finalized
rules pertaining to evaporated cane juice, the court held that the
primary jurisdiction doctrine warranted dismissal of the plaintiffs’
claims.62
Nevertheless, the Saubers plaintiffs attempted to argue that
POM Wonderful stands for the general proposition “that courts need
not defer to the FDA’s expertise in suits over deceptive or
misleading food labeling.”63
The Saubers court found this argument unconvincing, and
instead correctly recognized that POM Wonderful stands exclusively
for the proposition that the FDCA does not preclude Lanham Act
false or misleading advertising claims brought by competitors.64
Accordingly, POM Wonderful does not ensure the continued
viability of consumer-driven class actions for false or misleading
labels. As the POM Wonderful Court acknowledged, its decision did
not challenge the preemption defense’s validity.65 Moreover, as
Saubers correctly illustrates, POM Wonderful did not eliminate the
use of primary jurisdiction as a defense to consumer-driven
false-labeling actions.66
And, even if POM Wonderful does not by itself result in a
reduction in consumer-driven labeling litigation, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend67 significantly limits
consumers’ ability to attain class certification in labeling cases.68 In
that case, the Court held that consumers seeking class certification
must establish that damages are capable of measurement on a
classwide basis.69 Applying Comcast Corp. to a beverage-labeling
class action, Judge Dean Pregerson of the Central District of
California noted that class certification is not feasible “[i]n situations
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
Id.
POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014).
Saubers, 2014 WL 3908595, at *4.
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
Reich et al., supra note 50.
Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1433.
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where purported class members purchase an inexpensive product . . .
and are unlikely to retain receipts or other transaction records.”70
Consequently, it will be unsurprising if post-POM Wonderful,
plaintiff’s attorneys cease filing consumer-based suits and instead
focus more heavily on competitor-driven suits under the Lanham
Act.71
B. The Application of POM Wonderful
Beyond Food and Beverage Labeling
In POM Wonderful, the Court made clear that its holding
applied exclusively to food and beverage labels regulated by the
FDCA.72 An open question, however, is whether lower courts will
expand the POM Wonderful holding to cases beyond the scope of
food and beverage labeling.73 If district court cases decided after
POM Wonderful are any indication, competitors may bring Lanham
Act claims challenging product labels for a variety of products
regulated by different federal administrative agencies.
For example, in Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Medical
Corp.,74 a medical device company sued a competitor under the
Lanham Act for making false representations about an infectioncontrol device’s functional aspects.75 Recognizing that the plaintiff
sought “to protect its interests in the market, just as POM Wonderful
was doing in the case against Coca-Cola,” the Catheter Connections
court held that the FDCA did not preclude certain Lanham Act
claims.76 In support of its holding, the court reasoned that FDA
expertise is not required in examining “what drives buyers’
purchasing decisions.”77
Similarly, in Toddy Gear, Inc. v. Navarre Corp.,78 the court
applied POM Wonderful in its analysis of the potential preclusive
70. In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. ML 10-02199 DDP (RZx), 2014 WL 1225184, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014).
71. See Reich et al., supra note 50.
72. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2233 (2014).
73. Jessie F. Beeber & Sarah S. Park, A Whole New Lanham Act? A Look at Lexmark and
POM Wonderful in Action, LEXOLOGY (July 15, 2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail
.aspx?g=4a933260-ca83-4be4-bfd9-4f2c1315f319.
74. No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL 3536573 (D. Utah July 17, 2014).
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id. at *5–7.
77. Id. at *6.
78. No. 13 CV 8703, 2014 WL 4271631 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2014).
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effect of the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act (TFPIA).79 In
that case, a maker of a microfiber cloth used for cleaning electronic
devices brought a Lanham Act claim for false advertising against a
competitor.80 Like the FDCA at issue in POM Wonderful, the TFPIA
provides exclusive enforcement authority to an administrative
agency—the Federal Trade Commission in this case—to sanction
companies engaged in false or misleading labeling.81 Holding that
the TFPIA did not preclude a Lanham Act claim, the Toddy Gear
court mirrored the POM Wonderful Court’s statutory interpretation
analysis by arguing that the two statutes’ texts illustrate separate
scopes and purposes.82
Both Catheter Connections and Toddy Gear demonstrate that in
the wake of POM Wonderful, courts will routinely disregard the
preclusive effects of administrative statutes regulating a wide variety
of products.83 Consequently, there will likely be a proliferation of
Lanham Act suits concerning goods over which administrative
agencies have traditionally held exclusive enforcement authority.
This outcome is consistent with Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc.,84 which significantly relaxed the standing
requirement to bring false-advertising claims under the Lanham
Act.85 Decided by the Supreme Court shortly before POM
Wonderful, Lexmark held that a competitor need only plead an injury
to a commercial interest proximately caused by a company’s
misrepresentations to invoke the Lanham Act’s false-advertising
cause of action.86 Accordingly, following POM Wonderful and
Lexmark, administrative-law preclusion will prove an ineffective
roadblock to the likely expansion of Lanham Act false-advertising
claims.87
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id. at *1.
81. Id. at *2.
82. See id.
83. See Catheter Connections, Inc. v. Ivera Med. Corp., No. 2:14-CV-70-TC, 2014 WL
3536573, at *5–7 (D. Utah July 17, 2014); see also Toddy Gear, Inc., 2014 WL 4271631, at *2.
84. 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
85. Id. at 1389.
86. Id. at 1395.
87. See John Duffy, Opinion Analysis: The Triumph of the Lanham Act (and of Federal
Private Rights of Action), SCOTUSBLOG (June 13, 2014, 5:22 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2014/06/opinion-analysis-the-triumph-of-the-lanham-act-and-of-federal-private-rights-of-action/
(explaining “the Supreme Court’s increasingly ambivalent approach to administrative
regulation”).
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C. POM Wonderful Is Reflective of the Supreme Court’s
Increasing Ambivalence Toward Administrative Regulation
Aside from its effect on the false-advertising litigation
landscape, POM Wonderful also demonstrates that the Supreme
Court has grown increasingly wary of the primacy of federal
administrative agencies.88 Since the establishment of the
administrative state, the Court has often cast administrative agencies
in heroic terms;89 they were thought to “render valuable and very
necessary services in the solution of the complex governmental and
economic problems of our time.”90 Agency rulemakers’ specialized
training and experience were considered an asset in determining
policy in preparation for, or incidental to, administrative action.91 In
holding that the FDA does not have the “expertise in assessing
market dynamics that day-to-day consumers possess,” the POM
Wonderful Court showed how little is left of that notion.92
Although the Ninth Circuit barred POM’s Lanham Act claims
out of concern that they might “undermine FDA authority,”93 the
Supreme Court was not concerned with that possibility because the
Court recognized the limits of the FDA’s competence.94 Competitors,
the Court noted, “have detailed knowledge regarding how consumers
rely upon certain sales and marketing strategies” and an “awareness
of unfair competition practices [that] may be far more immediate and
accurate than that of agency rulemakers and regulators.”95
The Supreme Court’s concerns regarding administrative
competence are not unique to the POM Wonderful decision. In fact,
in a number of recent opinions, the Court has expressed deep
hostility toward expansive administrative power.96 For example, in
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Accounting Oversight Board,97 the
Court acknowledged “Congress’s power to create a vast and varied
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 513 (1943) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
91. Id.
92. POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014); Duffy, supra
note 87.
93. Pom Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 679 F.3d 1170, 1176–78 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d,
POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238.
94. Duffy, supra note 87.
95. POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238.
96. Duffy, supra note 87.
97. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
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federal bureaucracy” and expressed concern that such growth
“heightens the concern that [power] may slip from the Executive’s
control, and thus from that of the people.”98 Additionally, in City of
Arlington v. FCC,99 three Justices, in a dissenting opinion, reasoned
that “[i]t would be a bit much to describe [agency rulemaking
authority] as ‘the very definition of tyranny,’ but the danger posed by
the growing power of the administrative state cannot be
dismissed.”100
It can therefore be inferred that much of the analysis in POM
Wonderful reflects the Court’s recent skepticism concerning the
regulatory scope and competency of agency enforcement.101 As a
consequence, courts may follow POM Wonderful and look toward
private rights of action as suitable substitutes for inadequate agency
enforcement.102
VI. CONCLUSION
POM Wonderful empowers companies to bring suit against
competitors whose false or misleading labels cause competitive
injury. Although this decision effectively safeguards competitors’
commercial interests, the holding also has broader implications.
Because preemption, primary jurisdiction, and class certification
challenges remain viable roadblocks preventing successful consumer
class actions, it is likely that plaintiff’s lawyers will bring
competitor-based Lanham Act suits with greater frequency.103
Moreover, if lower court decisions interpreting POM Wonderful
provide any guidance, the Court’s holding may apply to a wide array
of product labeling cases aside from food and beverage labeling.104
Finally, POM Wonderful may indicate that the Supreme Court will
look to private rights of action instead of administrative regulations

98. Id. at 499.
99. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
100. Id. at 1879 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
101. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2238 (2014) (“The FDA,
however, does not have the same perspective or expertise in assessing market dynamics that
day-to-day competitors possess.”).
102. See Reply Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 22, POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. 2228 (No.
12-761), 2014 WL 1410441, at *22 (arguing that the FDA lacks the resources to engage in any
meaningful oversight of misleading food labels).
103. Reich et al., supra note 50.
104. Duffy, supra note 87.
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because of the Court’s growing concern over administrative
agencies’ unchecked power and questionable expertise.105

105. See POM Wonderful, 134 S. Ct. at 2238; City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1879 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting).

